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AUTOCRAT OF THE ARMCHAIR
DAVID F. LEVI†
1

Richard Posner is a marvel. He carries a full caseload as a U.S.
circuit judge on the Seventh Circuit, teaches at the University of
Chicago Law School, blogs with a Nobel Prize–winning economist
(Gary Becker), and writes at least a book a year as well as any
number of articles. His opinions are nicely written and explained. His
scholarly writing covers a wide range of academic and public policy
topics, from sex to literature, from jurisprudence to aging. Any large
issue or event, such as the impeachment of a president or the
treatment of captured Al Qaida members, is likely to elicit an
interesting and thorough treatment of the topic from Judge Posner.
Somehow he manages to be in the thick of things without diminishing
his judicial role, although it is not unlikely that his more provocative
academic writing kept him from an appointment to the United States
Supreme Court in the 1980s. By all accounts, he is also a generous
judicial and academic colleague. How he does all of this is one of the
mysteries. Perhaps the explanation is simple: he is brilliant, hard
working, and intellectually fearless. He is all of these things and more.
But is he an empiricist?
To be more precise, as a researcher who purports to describe
how most judges think at all levels of the legal system, does he
identify a reliable, sufficiently large data set and then apply

Copyright © 2009 by David F. Levi.
† Dean and Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Previously, United States
District Judge for the Eastern District of California (1990–2007), Chair and Member of the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee (1994–2003), and Chair of the Standing Committee on the Rules of
Practice and Procedure (2003–2007). I am grateful to Mitu Gulati, Ernest Young, Lauren
Collins, and Jennifer Dominguez for their many helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank
the Duke Law Journal for its part in organizing this Symposium and particularly for its
understanding of why this subject matter is of such importance.
1. Judge Posner is a great admirer of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. See THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). The allusion in
the title is to Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr.’s popular Atlantic Monthly column, The Autocrat of the
Breakfast-Table.
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appropriate statistical tests to the data such that others can evaluate
the strength of his generalizations and replicate his conclusions using
the same or other reliable data sets? Put somewhat differently, if
Judge Posner were to take the stand as an expert on how most judges
think most of the time, would his testimony be based upon “sufficient
facts or data” to qualify as “reliable” under the Federal Rules
2
governing admissibility of expert testimony? Furthermore, as a
distinguished judge who advocates for a particular approach to
3
judging, an approach he calls “pragmatism,” does he give sufficient
attention to the need for reliable “empirics”: transparent factfinding
that can be challenged and tested, at the very least, by the parties to
the litigation?
These questions might seem impertinent, even churlish. After all,
Judge Posner has written several articles and at least one book that
draw heavily on databases to answer questions about the legal
4
system. He is one of the founders of law and economics, and has
been a key part in the upsurge of law and economics scholarship and
law and social science research more generally, much of which
consists of empirical study.
Judge Posner is certainly capable of empirical work and
understands how it is done and its importance. But in his latest work
5
on judging, How Judges Think, he is no empiricist unless we are
satisfied with “armchair empiricism.” His generalizations about the
ways of the judge and the world are ex cathedra pronouncements that
generally lack any identified objective support outside of his own
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Testimony by Experts, provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3)
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702. The notes to Rule 702 caution: “If the witness is relying solely or primarily
on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is
reliably applied to the facts.” Id. advisory committee’s note; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585–98 (1993).
3. See text accompanying infra note 13.
4. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
(1996); Tomas Philipson & Richard A. Posner, A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the
Effects of Public Health Subsidies for STD Testing, 110 Q.J. ECON. 2 (1995); Richard A. Posner,
The 2000 Presidential Election: A Statistical and Legal Analysis, 12 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1
(2004).
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008).
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experience and belief. For many of his assertions, it would appear that
his dataset of judges is a set of one—himself. Further, as an advocate
for a particular kind of pragmatic judging—consciously and explicitly
making law embodying sound social policy—Judge Posner gives little
or no attention to the critical, what I would call “empirical,” question:
How does the judge, particularly the appellate judge, know what the
consequences of a new rule of law will be and whether those
consequences are likely to be good for society? These are contestable
issues that can be the subject of testimony and challenge within the
courtroom and the litigation process. When the record is not
developed, how does the judge make sound decisions about the social
6
policy consequences of different legal rules?
I write from the perspective of one who served as a U.S. district
judge for almost seventeen years and who was deeply involved in the
federal rulemaking process. Much of what I have to say about the
book stems from these two experiences. These experiences and that
perspective lead me to question a description of judging that pays so
little attention to the average case or to the processes of fair
adjudication, including the roles of the advocate and of our
procedural rules and practices. Indeed, one detects not just Judge
7
Posner’s well-known disdain for legal formalism, but something else
more troubling and fundamental: a resistance to the limitations on a
judge that are basic to our system, particularly that judges sit to
decide the issues actually presented within the confines of a particular
6. For example, a party might contend that affirmative action programs in professional
schools are necessary to the development of leaders in the military and in business. See Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003). This assertion can be established or contested by
expert testimony, based upon data and statistical tests, or perhaps by other evidence, including
personal experience, offered under oath and subject to cross-examination. Without such
evidence and testing processes, however, a judge would have no reliable basis for believing or
disbelieving the mere assertion of this causal relationship. Appellate judges who go beyond the
record to rely on factual contentions in amicus briefs or academic literature that have never
been tested in the courtroom, that have been “mailed in,” and that would not be admissible,
start down a perilous path inconsistent with the carefully constructed truth-seeking process that
has served well for many years.
7. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 371–72 (“Legalists invent canons of construction
(principles of interpretation) and distinctions between dictum and holding; embrace statutory
and constitutional literalism but carve narrow exceptions for literal readings that produce
absurd results; exalt rules over standards; [and] wash their hands of messy factual issues by
adopting principles of deferential appellate review . . . .”); Richard A. Posner, What Has
Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1663 (1990) (“Legal formalism is the idea
that legal questions can be answered by inquiry into the relation between concepts and hence
without need for more than a superficial examination of their relation to the world of fact. It is,
therefore, anti-pragmatic as well as anti-empirical.”).
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case and record. One senses that for this judge—a brilliant man
steeped in economics and academic learning, eager to make his mark
on the development of the law and to exercise his broad lawmaking
powers in the tradition of the great appellate lawgivers—such matters
as precedent, the procedural posture of a case, the strategic decisions
of the lawyers to advance certain positions and forgo others, and the
8
actual facts in the record simply get in the way.
Judge Posner’s basic point is that judicial decisionmaking is not
governed strictly by logic or the reasoned application of the law—text
and prior decisions—to facts, a process he calls “legalism” and the
adherents of which he calls “legalists.” According to Posner, “there is
a pronounced political element in the decisions of American judges,
including federal trial and intermediate appellate judges and U.S.
9
Supreme Court Justices.” There is also a personal element to judging,
he avers, because a judge’s personal characteristics “such as race and
sex; personality traits, such as authoritarianism; and professional and
life experiences, such as having been a prosecutor or having grown up
10
in turbulent times influence judging.” Political and personal factors,
according to Posner, generate preconceptions, often unconscious, that
11
affect judicial decision making.
Furthermore, Judge Posner contends that there is a significant
legislative aspect to judging; judges inevitably must make the law in
the open areas where the law is unclear and undeveloped. According
to Posner, this lawmaking role is unavoidable: “A combination of
structural and cultural factors imposes a legislative role on our judges
12
that they cannot escape.” Having established to his satisfaction that
legalism fails to explain judicial behavior and that the legalist
approach cannot resolve cases in the open areas of the law, Posner
offers his own template for judging, an approach he calls
“pragmatism” and describes as “basing judgments . . . on
consequences, rather than on deduction from premises in the manner
13
of a syllogism.”

8. See generally Linda E. Fisher, Pragmatism is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public
Policy and Empirical Reality, 31 N.M. L. REV. 455, 491–92 (2001) (documenting how Judge
Posner’s “pragmatist agenda” leads to his reliance on “extra-record facts”).
9. POSNER, supra note 5, at 369–70.
10. Id. at 370.
11. Id. at 11. Relying upon Bayesian decision theory, he calls such preconceptions
“Bayesian priors.” Id. at 67; see also infra note 30 and accompanying text.
12. POSNER, supra note 5, at 372.
13. Id. at 40.
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Curiously, Judge Posner considers that these are controversial
claims, even ones as banal as the claim that judges make the law by
applying it to new fact settings or that judges could be influenced by
their own life experiences. These claims may have been shocking in
the late nineteenth century when Justice Holmes asserted that history
14
has more to do with the development of the law than logic, but in a
post legal-realist world, these claims are the new orthodoxy.
According to Posner, however, most judges would vociferously deny
15
that their decisions are ever influenced in the slightest by “political”
or personal considerations, and most judges pretend that they are
16
finding the law and not making it. For what it’s worth, from the ease
of my own armchair, I would take just the opposite position: I would
say that most judges are more than aware that they are “making law,”
in the sense of amplifying it, when they apply precedents or statutory
language to particular factual settings. I would also contend that most
judges, particularly the very best ones, are acutely aware of the

14. “The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). The idea that legal materials sometimes leave an
open area within which the judge is freer to develop the law goes back many years. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121–50 (1961); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 348–56
(Max Knight trans., Univ. of Calif. Press 1967) (1934); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL REASONING 2–3, 7 (1949).
15. Judge Posner continues the unfortunate use of the term “political”—with its overtone
of partisan bias—to describe a judge’s reliance on judicial philosophy. Judge Michael Boudin, a
participant in this Symposium, comments upon the misleading use of the term in one of his
contributions to this Issue. See Michael Boudin, A Response to Professor Ramseyer, Predicting
Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences, 58 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1688 (2009) (calling the
“political” label of a judicial opinion “mere provocation”). For a compelling argument that
much of what Posner and others think of as “political” is actually quite consistent with legal
decisionmaking, see Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the
Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14–15, 18–21.
16. Judge Posner pokes a good deal of fun at Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. He
repeatedly points to and then mocks the Chief Justice’s assertion at his confirmation hearing
that judges are like baseball umpires who just apply the rules to the facts as they unfold on the
ground. E.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 78–81; see also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination
of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005). Yet even Judge Posner concedes that much of the time this
is exactly what judges do, POSNER, supra note 5, at 8, although one doubts that it is what
Supreme Court Justices do much of the time, see Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration
and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 708 (2007) (“Supreme Court Justices cannot even
agree on the basic contours of the ‘strike zone’ . . . because the constitutional text itself is
indeterminate and the potential source materials for gleaning its meaning in particular settings
are both numerous and contested.”).
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potential of personal factors, including judicial philosophy, life
experience, and personality, to affect how judges approach and then
decide legal issues. I would further say that part of the art of judging
rests in recognizing the existence of these potential influences and
then dealing with them in some appropriate way, depending on the
nature and strength of the influence.
There are a number of problems with Judge Posner’s
descriptions and prescriptions. Most fundamentally, much of what he
asserts about how judges think is just assertion, lacking any factual
support in empirical study or even anecdote. One suspects that most
of Posner’s claims are based on examination of his own decisional
processes or, perhaps, on his personal observations of some of his
colleagues. Yet unfortunately, the book is neither structured nor
17
argued as an autobiography. Here are some of the many
generalizations one finds in the book drawn from one knows not
where:
• “Most judges who oppose abortion rights do so because of
religious belief rather than because of a pragmatic assessment of
18
such rights.”
• “A judge in a nonjury proceeding who has to decide whether to
believe a witness’s testimony will often have formed before the
witness begins to testify an estimate of the likelihood that the
19
testimony will be truthful.”
• Judges are more inclined to convict than jurors because “judges
learn that prosecutors rarely file cases unless the evidence
20
against the defendant is overwhelming.”
• “[M]any, maybe most, judges would if asked deny that they
21
bring preconceptions to their cases[.]”
• “[J]udges whose background is law teaching rather than private
practice tend to be harder on the lawyers who appear before
22
them.”

17. An intellectual autobiography by Judge Posner would be a wonderful addition to the
sparse literature of judicial autobiography.
18. POSNER, supra note 5, at 13.
19. Id. at 65.
20. Id. at 68.
21. Id. at 72.
22. Id. at 74.
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• “Appellate judges promoted from the trial court may be more
likely than other appellate judges to vote to affirm a trial
23
judge.”
• “[A] former trial judge promoted to the court of appeals may be
more likely to focus more on the ‘equities’ of the individual
case . . . and less on its precedential significance than would his
24
colleagues who had never been trial judges.”
• “Most judges blend the two inquiries, the legalist and the
25
legislative, rather than addressing them in sequence.”
• “Accustomed to making nonlegalist judgments in the
[nonroutine cases], the judge is likely to allow nonlegalist
considerations to seep into his consideration of the [routine
26
case].”
• “Intuition plays a major role in judicial as in most decision
27
making.”
• “[T]here are a few professions . . . in which the negative
correlation between age and performance is weak. Judging is
one of them, though part of the reason is that judges in our
system are appointed at relatively advanced ages; this means
that early decliners tend to be screened out and judges tend not
to get bored, or run dry, at the same age at which persons in
other fields do who have been in the same line of work for many
28
years.”
• “Rather than a shortage of applicants for federal judgeships,
29
there is a surplus.”
There are many more similarly rank assertions in the book. No
studies are cited because there is nothing to cite to. The problem with
these assertions for the most part is not that they are clearly untrue—
some of them are couched tentatively, perhaps in acknowledgement
of the lack of data and supporting empirical research—but that, in the
absence of data and empirical studies, it is impossible to know how
true or untrue they are. Thus, if Judge Posner’s assertions were based
upon data, it would be possible to test and then calibrate the
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 164.
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significance of some of these assertions, and then to ask important
follow-up questions. For example, to say that intuition or
preconception plays a role in judicial decisionmaking is not to say
anything useful. Judge Posner takes great delight in relying on
Bayesian decision theory to make the point that judges have
30
preconceptions, “priors” in Bayesian jargon, which can affect their
decisions. The existence of preconception in the legal system is well
known. Many of the procedures in a trial or other proceedings
31
attempt to neutralize the effects of bias or preconception. In a jury
trial, for example, lawyers and judges use voir dire to expose potential
jurors’ preconceptions. Once exposed, the judge can address and
neutralize these preconceptions to the satisfaction of the participants
or the lawyer will strike the juror. Judges and lawyers constantly
remind jurors to keep an open mind as a trial proceeds to guard
against premature conclusions based upon only some of the evidence.
In court trials, I frequently reminded myself to simply listen and not
attempt to reach tentative views of how the case ultimately would be
decided. I did not like to discuss ongoing court trials with law clerks
or colleagues precisely because I did not wish to start characterizing

30. Judge Posner is unapologetic in his use of such jargon. “Judicial preconceptions are
best understood, we shall see, with the aid of Bayesian decision theory. Not that this is how
judges themselves would describe their thought process. And ‘Bayes’s theorem’ is not the only
term I shall be using that is likely to alarm some readers of a book about judges.” Id. at 11. Like
Monsieur Jourdain, who was so delighted and surprised to learn that he had been speaking in
prose all of his life, see MOLIÈRE, THE BOURGEOIS GENTLEMAN 30–31 (Bernard Sahlins trans.,
Ivan R. Dee, Inc. 2000) (1670), I believe that most judges would be startled to learn that their
preconceptions are actually Bayesian priors. I question whether Posner’s addition of this label
advances the central preoccupation of all who are involved in the litigation process with finding
ways of neutralizing preconception and bias—by jurors, judges, and witnesses, whether
conscious or unconscious. Because there are no data, it is difficult to know whether unconscious
priors have any significant effect on judges in some or most cases. As to conscious priors, I find
it difficult to believe that a good trial judge would ever rely in significant part on a hunch or
prior to find any material fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, addressing such
preconceptions is one of the critical goals of a fair trial proceeding and of the rules that govern
such proceedings.
31. There is a large body of literature on debiasing techniques. See, e.g., Linda Babcock,
George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacaroff, Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 914–23 (1997) (proposing debiasing mechanisms for negotiations);
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 200–02
(2006) (considering how debiasing through law works to address a range of legal questions in
areas “from consumer safety law to corporate law to property law”); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV.
1060, 1108–15 (2006) (advocating for new debiasing techniques in the race context). One might
expect an empirical account of preconceptions to include a thorough investigation of these
debiasing techniques and an analysis of whether they actually work in practice.
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the evidence until I had heard all of it. For the same reasons, many
judges continue to instruct jurors not to discuss the case until
deliberations have begun and the jurors have heard all of the
evidence, the arguments of counsel, and the judge’s instructions.
Good lawyers attempt to predict the sorts of preconceptions that a
judge may have and then address them with either facts or
32
arguments. Good judges are constantly on the lookout for their own
preconceptions. When preconception rises to the level of bias, good
judges will recuse themselves on their own motion.
It is not nearly good enough to point out that judges and jurors,
like others, have preconceptions. What would be useful and
important to know is whether these preconceptions are fixed and
strong, whether they may become fluid as a trial develops, and
whether there are fair procedures for addressing them. Judge Posner
does not seem to appreciate the dynamic nature of litigation and how
many times in a case or trial a judge will rule one way and then
reverse course later. What does this say about the strength of initial
preconceptions? It would be important to know whether the ability to
overcome preconception and keep an open mind is a part of the
judicial craft that can be studied, learned, and improved upon. If
scholars and judges could study preconceptions in some systematic
way, they could ask many interesting empirical questions about them.
And they might develop new methods for neutralizing, cabining, or,
at least, revealing their role. Without data, however, Posner is at a
loss to move forward our understanding and procedures. His bare
assertion that judges are prisoners of their conscious and unconscious
preconceptions diminishes the judicial role and the striving by
conscientious judges for objectivity and fairness. His assertion will
become fodder for ideologues who believe that everything is
33
“political” and that all relationships are defined by power.

32. When I was the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of California from 1986–1990,
my office lost a suppression motion involving the search of a home that contained a
methamphetamine laboratory, because the judge found that the affiant had omitted from the
affidavit that the surveillance officers had seen young children present at the scene. The judge
assumed that young children would not typically be present at the site of a methamphetamine
lab because of the danger of explosion and fire, and that therefore this was material information
detracting from probable cause. It was a failure of advocacy not to demonstrate to the judge that
this assumption was incorrect: Methamphetamine manufacturers often show little concern for
the safety of their children or neighbors.
33. In my brief experience as a law teacher, I find that law students are particularly
susceptible to the belief that judges are political actors who routinely decide cases according to
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Another empirical problem with the book as a description of
how judges think is that Judge Posner is simply uninterested in the
vast majority of cases that come before the courts. At least at the
appellate level, he concedes that judges will decide the quotidian case
in precisely the same way. The law will be clear, or clear enough, and
the facts will be uncontested, assumed, as on an appeal from a
summary judgment ruling, or found by the court below by trial or
hearing. Applying the law to the facts in these cases may require a
degree of discernment and elbow grease, but most appellate judges
will come to the same conclusions on the arguments presented. In
Posner’s lexicon, these cases can be decided by the application of
“legalist” techniques, which treat the law as a system of rules that
produces predictable outcomes based on logic, reason, precedent, and
common sense. These cases do not interest Posner even though, he
concedes, they account for most of the cases that appellate judges are
34
thinking about. It is these cases that end up in “unpublished”
35
dispositions from the courts of appeals. The overall dominance of
such cases within the system is probably even greater than the
appellate statistics suggest if one considers that in many cases the
36
parties do not elect to appeal from the judgment of the district court.
Judge Posner is interested in the comparatively few cases that
produce disagreement among judges and that tend to end up in the
Supreme Court or in the casebooks. Though a fraction of the
caseload, these are the cases that command his attention. These are
their own self-interest, partisan beliefs, previous experience, and such personal characteristics as
gender, religion, and race.
34. POSNER, supra note 5, at 8 (“Legalism drives most judicial decisions, though generally
they are the less important ones for the development of legal doctrine or the impact on
society.”). Judge Posner now concedes that although his book purports to describe how all
judges think, it is concerned mainly with the appellate courts, see Interview, A Conversation with
Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 DUKE L.J. 1807, 1816 (2009), and only a subset of their cases—
those in the “open area.” Considering that unpublished opinions account for more than 80
percent of the appellate courts’ dockets, see infra note 35, Judge Posner is actually focused on a
relatively small number of cases within the remaining percentage.
35. See JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 48 tbl.S-3 (2007),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (noting that 83.5
percent of opinions of cases in the U.S. courts of appeals are unpublished).
36. Many cases are not appealed at all. District judges decide them in whole or in part and
the parties accept the rulings or come to some settlement based on their understanding of the
value of the case according to their own “legalist” analysis. See generally U.S. Courts, Federal
Courts Management Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html (last visited Mar. 23,
2009) (showing that 349,969 cases were filed in federal district courts in 2008, whereas only
61,104 appeals were filed in the courts of appeals during that same time period).
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the cases, he contends, that cannot be decided only by reference to
prior case law, the language of statute, and the like, but seem to call
forth some application of the judge’s personal policy beliefs or
judicial philosophy. These are the cases that generate disagreement
and appeals, that drive the development of the law, and that create
reputations for our great appellate judges.
But the typical case must have its due in any description of how
37
judges think most of the time. For an empiricist, the observation that
in the vast majority of cases judges of different political stripes,
genders, religions, races, ages, and experience all reach the same
conclusion might be seen as the important point if one were to
describe how judges think most of the time, instead of how appellate
38
judges think a little bit of the time in uncertain cases. The very fact
that judges are usually “legalists” might cause one to ask if the legalist
approach is the starting point in every case, including those that
eventually require the judge to draw upon policy preferences. Judge
Posner contends otherwise. He asserts that “[a]ccustomed to making
nonlegalist judgments in the [nonroutine cases], the judge is likely to
allow nonlegalist considerations to seep into his consideration of the
39
[routine case].” Why the reverse is not just as or more plausible,
Posner does not say. And if the experience of our legal system by the
people who use it matters, and I suggest that it should, the handling
and disposition of the typical case would be of very great importance.
Judge Posner is not interested in the typical case. Like some
other appellate judges, he seems to have a deep-seated enmity toward
the everyday case. The dislike of the average case by certain federal
appellate judges, including Posner, became clear during the 2004
debate over a proposed change to Appellate Rule 32.1 that made
40
citable so-called “unpublished” opinions. The unpublished opinion,
37. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 401–08 (1985) (emphasizing
the need to consider less-litigated constitutional provisions when creating constitutional
theories).
38. See Thomas J. Mills & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
831, 841 (2008) (noting that a “great deal might be learned by incorporating unpublished
opinions” into New Legal Realism analysis because most studies are now limited to published
opinions that, because of their atypical nature, overstate the actual effects of judicial ideology
and other characteristics).
39. POSNER, supra note 5, at 85.
40. The new rule invalidated local appellate rules that forbade the citation of
“unpublished” opinions:
Rule 32.1. Citing Judicial Dispositions
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal
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a misnomer given that all opinions are now published and available
electronically, is a phenomenon of the federal circuit courts and some
state appellate courts. Before electronic publishing, an unpublished
opinion was truly unpublished; the court did not send the opinion to
West or other publishers and it was usually available only to the
parties in the litigation in slip form or in the file maintained at the
courthouse. These opinions were not citable because they were not
generally available, and to permit citation would give unfair
advantage to institutional, repeat litigants who would have their own
collections of these cases. But with the advent of electronic research
and with the requirement that court filings be available on public
court websites, it makes no sense to consider these opinions
unavailable or unpublished. They are easily obtainable and they
appear in any electronic search. Nonetheless, many of the circuits
41
continued to treat such opinions as second-class citizens. Some
courts denied them precedential effect, but permitted citation for
whatever guidance the opinion might offer, but other courts went a
step further, barring the parties from even citing the opinion on pain
of sanctions. Given that more than 80 percent of the output of the
42
courts of appeals consists of unpublished opinions, this prohibition
was no small matter. This is not the place to rehash the arguments
43
over the rule amendment. The rule changed, and all unpublished
opinions from all federal appellate courts at least may now be cited,
44
even if they lack precedential force in some circuits.

judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been:
(i) designated as “unpublished,” “not for publication,” “non-precedential,” “not
precedent,” or the like; and
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
41. Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang over the
Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430–31 (2005) (summarizing
the ways circuit courts treat unpublished opinions).
42. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
43. Letter from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to David
F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2–13 (May 6, 2005),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2005.pdf (summarizing the debates,
arguments, and public comments over the proposed new rule 32.1); Letter from Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 53–93 (May 14, 2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2004.pdf (chronicling the arguments on each side of
the debate); see also Schiltz, supra note 41, at 1458–90.
44. See supra note 40.
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Judge Posner lined up with the opponents to the rule change in
45
46
his circuit. Like most of his colleagues, he considered that citation
of unpublished opinions would cause the judges a great deal of
needless effort to distinguish cases that were best left undisturbed and
47
unread. He did not think then and he does not think now that these
cases contribute anything to our understanding of how the legal
system works or how judges think. Yet this point of view is
questionable given the very large number of these cases. Indeed, one
might have expected Posner, a sometime empiricist and an observer
of the judicial system, at least to have appreciated the use that a
lawyer could make of unpublished opinions to mount an empirical
argument. One reason a lawyer might wish to cite to unpublished
opinions is to show an appellate court how a rule is actually working
in practice, where it is being applied, whether it is being applied
consistently, and the like. There are many contexts in which knowing
how a rule of law is actually coming to the courts will be important to
advocacy, to the court, and indeed to the very pragmatism that Posner
advocates. For example, when a defendant asserts qualified immunity,
a party might wish to show how earlier rulings demonstrate that a rule
of law either is or is not “clearly established.” Or if one wishes to
argue about the consequences of a particular rule of law for other
cases and factual circumstances—and consequences are the lodestar
of Posner’s pragmatism—one would want to look at the vast majority

45. Letter from Richard A. Posner et al., to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm.
on Appellate Rules 1 (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Appellate_
Comments_2003/03-AP-396.pdf.
46. Judge Easterbrook was a notable exception. See Letter from Frank H. Easterbrook,
Circuit Judge, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure
1 (Feb. 13, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Appellate_Comments_2003/03-AP367.pdf; see also Tony Mauro, Difference of Opinion; Should Judges Make More Rulings
Available as Precedent? How an Obscure Proposal Is Dividing the Federal Bench, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2004, at 1 (quoting Judge Easterbrook’s remark that barring citations to
unpublished opinions “implies that judges have something to hide”).
47. A letter to the Appellate Rules Committee Chair read, in part:
Because the order is not citable, the judges do not have to spend a lot of time
worrying about nuances of language. . . . [We] do not need to worry about nuances of
language because the order will not be thrown back in our faces someday as a
precedent. And thrown back they will be, no matter how often we state that
unpublished orders though citable (if the proposed rule is adopted) are not
precedents. For if a lawyer states in its brief that in our unpublished opinion in A v. B
we said X and in C v. D we said Y and in this case the other side wants us to say Z, we
can hardly reply that when we don’t publish we say what we please and take no
responsibility. We will have a moral duty to explain, distinguish, reaffirm, overrule,
etc. any unpublished order brought to our attention by counsel.
Letter from Richard A. Posner et al., supra note 45, at 1.
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of cases in which the consequences are most likely to occur. In this
sense, the unpublished opinion contains important data, not because
the reasoning in the opinion may or may not be persuasive, but
because of the very existence of the opinion, the outcome, and the
controversy. Yet Posner is not interested in such data, and one may
48
wonder why.
This tendency to undervalue the data and the processes of the
legal system is observable in How Judges Think in additional ways.
Judge Posner purports to describe how all judges think, but he seems
to have very little feel for the trial court and for the role of the bar
and the parties. There is hardly any discussion of the influence on
judicial thinking of the briefs, the arguments, and the lawyers’
strategic decisions to press certain contentions and let others slide.
The failure to discuss the effect of lawyering on how judges think
leaves the impression that the briefs and other work product,
including argument and direct- and cross-examination, are not of
much significance. I disagree with this, and I think other trial judges
would as well. In a courtroom, with the parties often present and
intensely interested in the fairness of the proceedings, a judge feels
quite constrained to address the questions and issues presented by the
lawyers. A judge who declines to address those issues will appear
unfair or biased. Similarly, a judge who generates arguments that the
lawyers did not raise will appear to assist one side or the other.
Lawyers and parties who face a judge acting as a roving commissioner
will view the judge as yet another adversary in the courtroom, and as
biased or even co-opted in some way. Perhaps I overstate these
constraints or perhaps I was too sensitive to them as a judge. The
point is that in a description of how all judges think, it leaves a huge

48. If the reason were simply the time it would take to distinguish the reasoning or holding
in such cases, and a view that the cases are so inadequately prepared that they do not deserve
this expenditure of time and attention, then it should satisfy that the cases have no precedential
value and the court is free to ignore their reasoning and wording. But in an interview posted on
the How Appealing website, Judge Posner indicates that he neither understands nor could
accept such an approach:
I don’t like the idea of allowing unpublished opinions to be cited, which is another
way of saying that I think courts should be permitted to designate some of their
decisions as nonprecedential and therefore not worth citing. (Apparently under the
new rule, we won’t be allowed to forbid citation of unpublished opinions, but will be
allowed to deny precedential force to them, a combination that seems to me to make
no sense.)
20 Questions for Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, HOWAPPEALING.COM, Dec. 1, 2003, http://howappealing.law.com/20q/2003_12_01_20qappellateblog_archive.html.
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hole to ignore the effect of lawyers and their clients, and the need to
run a fair courtroom, on judicial thinking.
Nor does Judge Posner consider the way in which the record is
developed in a case and the constraints that the record might impose
on a fair-minded trial or appellate judge. Trial judges spend a good
deal of their time deciding what evidence is sufficiently reliable to be
admitted. Lawyers devote their attention to challenging and
countering testimony that they view as misleading or inaccurate. The
system imposes certain requirements, most notably, in the common
law tradition, that witnesses cannot “mail” it in. They have to submit
themselves to rigorous questioning under oath.
And this process for reliable, fair, and transparent factfinding
points to another problem in Judge Posner’s theory and discussion:
He never addresses how a carefully constructed factual record relates
to his theory of pragmatic judging. Yet without such a record,
pragmatic judges are at sea and at large, making it up according to
their own lights. For Posner, a good judge is one who develops the
law in directions that are sensible and that produce beneficial
49
consequences for society. This is unobjectionable if the judge
includes the lawyers in this quest such that there is a sound factual
basis in the record—data—upon which the judge reliably can project
those consequences. But judges who think that they know what is
sensible or beneficial merely by dint of education or intellect are just
as formalist as the “legalists” to the degree that they rely upon a fixed
set of theories of human nature, economics, history, or political
economy out in the ether to deduce rules of law, rather than building
such rules from the ground up by responding to the particular facts of
a particular situation and dispute. The trial judge who, after hearing
argument, honestly identifies what the grounds of decision will be and
permits the parties to address those grounds and develop in the
record a factual basis in support or derogation of those grounds—
including consequences to the greater society, if those consequences
will be a basis for the decision—is to my mind the best trial judge.
Similarly, the appellate judge who plays by the rules, abiding by the
record presented and remanding to the district court for additional
factfinding when necessary, is the best kind of appellate judge. And
these judges are neither legalists nor pragmatists. These judges are
empiricists.
49. See POSNER, supra 5, at 13 (“A pragmatic judge assesses the consequences of judicial
decisions for their bearing on sound public policy as he conceives it.”).

